

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2769

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 MBFR VIENNA 0222

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM NATO MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: PRESS GUIDANCE ON THE NEW INITIATIVE

REF: STATE 96822 DTG 142343Z APR 78

1. WE ARE REPORTING BELOW THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY NETHERLANDS REP ON APRIL 19 PLUS PRESS CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AS TRILATERALLY APPROVED BY FRG, UK AND US DELEGATIONS ON APRIL 14.

2. WE NOTE WASHINGTON GUIDANCE IN PARA 2 OF REFTEL THAT WESTERN PRESS STATEMENT AND QS AND AS SHOULD AVOID SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF SPECIFIC CONTENT OF INITIATIVE ON BASIS THAT CONFIDENTIALITY OF NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE PROTECTED. WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL SEE THAT THIS HAS BEEN DONE WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT INCLUDES A BRIEF CHARACTERIZATION OF MAIN ASPECTS OF WESTERN PROPOSAL. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT A STANDARD MINIMUM DESCRIPTION OF THIS KIND IS DESIRABLE FOR USE BY NATO AND IN CAPITALS OF PARTICIPATING ALLIES. REFUSAL TO CHARACTERIZE THE CONTENT OF THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE IN ANY WAY WOULD RESULT IN LARGE NUMBER OF PRESS INQUIRIES IN INDIVIDUAL CAPITALS AND NATO WHICH INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS MAY BE INCLINED TO ANSWER IN THEIR
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OWN WAY DURING THE MONTH WHICH WILL INTERVENE BETWEEN THE END OF THE ROUND ON APRIL 19 AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE VIENNA TALKS ON MAY 18. A NUMBER OF VIENNA BASED WESTERN JOURNALISTS ALREADY HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF INDIVIDUAL DETAILS OF WESTERN INITIATIVE. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THESE HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES. THIS CIRCUMSTANCE ALONE MEANS THAT THERE WILL IN NEXT WEEKS BE LEAKS IN WESTERN PRESS ABOUT

CONTENT OF THE INITIATIVE. WE BELIEVE THAT WESTERN PRESS SPOKESMAN AT NATO AND AT INDIVIDUAL CAPITALS WOULD BE IN BEST POSITION TO DEAL WITH THESE IF THEY HAD AVAILABLE A BRIEF AUTHORIZED DESCRIPTION OF CONTENT. THEY COULD THEN DECLINE TO GO FURTHER IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS.

3. IF THE BRIEF DESCRIPTION NOW CONTAINED IN DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE IS APPROVED, WE WOULD INTEND TO INFORM SOVIET DELEGATION IN ADVANCE OF ITS USE IN ORDER TO AVOID CLAIMS OF BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN THIS LIMITED REGARD.

4. SOVIET REP TOLD US REP ON APRIL 15 THAT SOVIET REP PLANS TO GIVE GENERAL OUTLINE OF WESTERN INITIATIVE TO REPRESENTATIVES OF NEUTRAL COUNTRIES WHOM HE USUALLY SEES AT END OF ROUND. THIS MIGHT OF ITSELF GENERATE FURTHER LEAKS.

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PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY
AMBASSADOR W. DE VOS VAN STEENWIJK
ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS
IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS SEEN BY WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AT THE END OF THE FOURTEENTH ROUND.

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WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONSIDER THIS ROUND TO HAVE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT ONE WITH RESPECT TO AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATION.

I SAY THIS BECAUSE THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AT TODAY'S PLENARY SESSION TABLED A MAJOR NEW INITIATIVE INTENDED TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATION DECISIVELY TOWARD A FIRST AGREEMENT.

OUR INITIATIVE TAKES ACCOUNT OF TWO PRINCIPAL INTERESTS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED BY EASTERN PARTICIPANTS.

FIRST, THE EAST HAS LONG EMPHASIZED ITS INTEREST THAT THE WEST SHOULD PROVIDE IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT A COMMITMENT ON THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA.

THE WEST HAS NOW OFFERED TO UNDERTAKE IN PHASE I A COMMITMENT ON THE OVERALL AMOUNT AND TIMING OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN PHASE II BY THESE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

SECOND, THE EAST HAS CONTINUOUSLY STRESSED THEIR OBJECTION TO

WITHDRAWING AN ENTIRE SOVIET TANK ARMY TO THE USSR. THE NEW INITIATIVE WOULD ALTER THE REDUCTION REQUIREMENTS ENVISIONED IN PHASE I FOR THE USSR. THE USSR WOULD NOW BE EXPECTED TO

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WITHDRAW FIVE INDIVIDUAL DIVISIONS NOT AN ENTIRE TANK ARMY AS A SINGLE FORMATION. THE WEST CONTINUES TO PROPOSE WITHDRAWAL OF 68,000 MEN AND 1700 TANKS BY THE USSR.

THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE MADE THIS MOVE BECAUSE OF THEIR DEEP INTEREST IN ACHIEVING A FIRST AGREEMENT BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW ACTUALLY DO ENTER A DECISIVE STAGE DEPENDS ON THE RESPONSE WHICH THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WILL MAKE TO THIS NEW INITIATIVE. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED TO OUR EASTERN COLLEAGUES THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO AN EASTERN RESPONSE COMMENSURATE WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MOVE WE HAVE JUST MADE.

THIS NEGOTIATING ROUND WAS ALSO IMPORTANT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE DATA DISCUSSION. DURING THIS ROUND, THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED ON THE MODALITIES OF A FURTHER EXCHANGE OF DATA, AND THEN WENT ON TO TABLE ADDITIONAL DATA, AND TO RESPOND TO EACH OTHER'S QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NEWLY TABLED DATA.

THE DISCUSSION HAS NOT THUS FAR CLARIFIED THE REASONS FOR
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THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN MANPOWER IN THE AREA. NEVERTHELESS, A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL DATA IS NOW AVAILABLE TO THE PARTICIPANTS, AND THIS IS MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO CONDUCT THE DATA DISCUSSION ON A MORE CONCRETE AND PURPOSEFUL WAY.

THE DISCREPANCY MUST, OF COURSE, BE RESOLVED BEFORE THERE CAN BE AGREEMENT ON DATA. AGREEMENT ON DATA ON MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA IS ESSENTIAL FOR AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. WITHOUT SUCH AN AGREEMENT, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE VOLUME OF REDUCTIONS OR TO ESTABLISH LIMITATIONS. FOR THIS REASON, OUR NEW INITIATIVE IS CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT ON MANPOWER DATA. IT IS NOW MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER TO WORK IN A PRACTICAL AND BUSINESSLIKE WAY TO DETERMINE THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. THE PARTICIPANTS NOW HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, BUT NO MATTER WHAT PROGRESS IS MADE ON SUCH ISSUES, THE DATA DISCREPANCY MUST BE RESOLVED, OR IT WILL REMAIN AN OBSTACLE TO A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT.

IN SUM, THIS HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT AND EVENTFUL ROUND. FROM THE WESTERN VIEWPOINT, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT HAS ENDED BY PROVIDING A REAL BASIS FOR OVERCOMING THE STANDSTILL IN THESE TALKS AND FOR ENTERING THE DECISIVE STAGE OF NEGOTIATION OF A FIRST AGREEMENT. BUT THIS WILL DEPEND ON THE RESPONSE THE EAST MAKES TO OUR NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS.
END TEXT

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DRAFT END OF ROUND CONTINGENCY Q'S AND A'S

A. NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE

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1. POSSIBLE SITUATION

PRESIDENT CARTER RECENTLY DEFERRED A DECISION ON PRODUCTION OF THE NEUTRON WARHEAD. SOME HAVE INTERPRETED THIS ACTION AS A SIGN OF SOFTNESS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WARSAW PACT. NOW THE WEST IS MAKING A MOVE WHICH APPARENTLY INVOLVES FURTHER CONCESSIONS TO THE WARSAW PACT POSITION. WON'T THIS MOVE REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION IN THE EAST OF WESTERN SOFTNESS? IS THERE A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE AND THE RECENT U.S. DECISION TO DEFER PRODUCTION OF THE NEUTRON WARHEAD?

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THE PURPOSE OF NATO'S NEW INITIATIVE IS TO UNDERScore THE IMPORTANCE THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS PLACE ON MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS A SATISFACTORY MBFR AGREEMENT. IT IS INTENDED TO ELICIT A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE FROM THE EAST. THE WESTERN INITIATIVE STANDS ON ITS OWN MERIT AND IS NOT RELATED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. NOR IS IT RELATED TO THE RECENT DECISION OF THE US TO DEFER PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS WITH ENHANCED RADIATION EFFECTS. HOWEVER, AS THE US GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED, SUPPORTED BY ITS ALLIES, THE ULTIMATE DECISION REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT TO INCORPORATE ER FEATURES IN NATO'S BATTLEFIELD WEAPONS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH

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THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT IN ITS CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS PROGRAMS AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS AFFECTING WESTERN SECURITY, AND IN ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS WHICH BEAR ON THIS, INCLUDING THE VIENNA TALKS. THE WEST WILL WATCH CAREFULLY THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS REGARD.

1.Q. POSSIBLE QUESTION

IS IT NOT TRUE THAT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ARE A LOGICAL PLACE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO DISPLAY THE RESTRAINT IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES PRESIDENT CARTER INDICATED HE WOULD BE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT IN MAKING AN ULTIMATE DECISION ON THE NEUTRON WEAPON?

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

AS THE US GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED, SUPPORTED BY ITS ALLIES, THE ULTIMATE DECISION REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT TO INCORPORATE ER FEATURES IN NATO'S BATTLEFIELD WEAPONS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT IN ITS CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS PROGRAMS AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS AFFECTING WESTERN SECURITY, AND IN ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS WHICH BEAR ON THIS, INCLUDING THE VIENNA TALKS. THE WEST WILL WATCH CAREFULLY THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS REGARD.

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2.Q. DOESN'T THIS MEAN THEN THAT THE WEST IS THE ONLY SIDE MAKING CONCESSIONS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS? THE EAST HAS NOT CHANGED ITS PROPOSAL FOR THE OUTCOME SINCE THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WEST AUGMENTED ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS AND OFFERED TO TAKE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WITHOUT ASKING MORE OF THE EAST IN DECEMBER 1975, AND NOW THERE IS ANOTHER INITIATIVE MODIFICATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION, WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN NO MODIFICATIONS IN THE EASTERN POSITION.

A. YOU ARE RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THE WEST HAS NOW TAKEN TWO MAJOR INITIATIVES TO MEET EASTERN CONCERNS ON THE WEST'S EFFORTS TO MOVE THESE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. IT IS NOW UP TO THE EAST TO SHOW SIMILAR WILLINGNESS TO MEET THE CONCERNS OF THE WEST.

3. Q. WHY HAS IT TAKEN SO LONG FOR THE WEST EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA TO AGREE TO MAKE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON SCOPE AND TIMING OF REDUCTIONS? WHY WERE THESE COMMITMENTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE WEST'S DECEMBER 1975 PROPOSALS?

A. THE WEST CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT IT GAVE AN ADEQUATE GENERAL COMMITMENT IN THE DEC 1975 PROPOSALS. THE EAST DID NOT HOWEVER, REGARD THESE COMMITMENTS AS ADEQUATE.

4. Q. TODAY'S PLENARY STATEMENT WITH THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE WAS DELIVERED BY THE FRG REP. IN THE PAST, THE END-OF-ROUND PLENARIES HAVE BEEN DELIVERED BY THE US REP. DOES THIS CHANGE HAVE ANY PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE? IS IT RELATED TO THE FACT THAT THE WEST TABLED A NEW INITIATIVE TODAY?

A. THE WESTERN POSITION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS ALWAYS AGREED TO WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND NO PARTICULAR NATIONAL LABEL IS ATTACHED TO IT. EACH WESTERN PLENARY SPEAKER SPEAKS FOR THE
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ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

5. Q. IS THIS A GERMAN INITIATIVE?

A. THE INITIATIVE PRESENTED TODAY IS AN INITIATIVE OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. IT IS, OF COURSE, WELL KNOWN THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WAS THE FIRST TO RAISE THE CONCEPT OF TAKING A NEW INITIATIVE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WHEN HE TOOK IT UP WITH PRESIDENT CARTER IN WASHINGTON LAST JULY.

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6. Q. CAN YOU GIVE US FURTHER DETAILS ON THE CONTENT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS?

A. GIVEN THE RULES OF CONFIDENTIALITY WHICH GOVERN THESE TALKS, ALL WE CAN SAY NOW IS CONTAINED IN MY STATEMENT.

7. Q. DOES YOUR MOVE ON PHASE I COMMITMENTS MEAN YOU HAVE MODIFIED YOUR POSITION ON THE COLLECTIVE CEILING?

A. NO, IT DOES NOT.

8. Q. HAVE YOU CHANGED THE NATURE OF THE OVERALL MANPOWER REDUCTIONS YOU ARE ASKING FROM THE EAST?

A. NO, WE WANT THEM TO REDUCE FROM THEIR PRESENT LEVEL, THAT IS, THEIR LEVEL AS OF A SPECIFIED DATE, TO THE COMMON CEILING.

9. Q. ARE THESE NEW WESTERN REDUCTION COMMITMENTS INDIVIDUAL ONES?

A. NO, THEY ARE COLLECTIVE ONES.

10. Q. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REDUCTION OF A COMPLETE
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SOVIET TANK ARMY AND YOUR PRESENT PROPOSAL?

A. A TANK ARMY IS A SINGLE LARGE FORMATION. NOW THE
SOVIETS CAN CHOOSE ANY FIVE DIVISIONS FROM WITHIN
THE AREA.

11. Q. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE NATO COUNCIL APPROVED THIS
INITIATIVE LAST DECEMBER. WHY WAS IT PRESENTED ONLY
NOW?

A. WE NEED TO HAVE SOME PROGRESS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION
BEFORE PRESENTING OUR NEW PROPOSAL BECAUSE DATA IS A
NECESSARY PREREQUISITE FOR ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT.
THIS DATA EXCHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE AND SO WE HAVE NOW
PRESENTED OUR PROPOSALS.12. Q. THE WESTERN DECISION TO
PRESENT THE NEW INITIATIVE WAS LINKED TO THE STATUS OF THE DATA
DISCUSSION. WHAT IS THERE ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION
THAT LED THE WEST TO TABLE THE INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME?

A. THE MAIN FACTORS WHICH LED THE WEST TO DECIDE THIS IS
AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO PRESENT THE NEW INITIATIVE WERE CITED
IN MY OPENING STATEMENT. THE FACT THAT ADDITIONAL DATA HAS BEEN
EXCHANGED IS ALSO RELEVANT.

13. Q. IF THE NEW WESTERN MOVE REGARDING SOVIET WITHDRAWALS
IS SO SIGNIFICANT, DOESN'T IT DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY?

A. THE PARTICIPATING ALLIES HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THIS QUESTION,
AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE WESTERN POSITION, AS MODIFIED BY THE
NEW PROPOSALS, SHOULD OFFER THE BASIS FOR A SATISFACTORY FIRST
AGREEMENT, WITHOUT DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE PARTICI-
PANTS. SECURITY IN EUROPE WOULD IN FACT BE STRENGTHENED BY AN
AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF APPROPRIATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES.
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14. Q. MEMBERS OF THE PRESS INDICATE THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES
ARE ATTEMPTING TO PLAY DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW WESTERN
INITIATIVE BY STATING THAT IT FAILS TO ADDRESS A NUMBER OF
IMPORTANT EASTERN CONCERNS, INCLUDING THE MOST IMPORTANT.

A. WE DO NOT THINK IT CONSTRUCTIVE OF THE EAST TO COMPLAIN THAT THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE ALLEGEDLY FAILS TO MEET SPECIFIC CONCERNS. THE FACT IS THAT THE WESTERN MOVE DEALS COMPREHENSIVELY WITH MAJOR POINTS ON WHICH THE EAST HAS PLACED STRONG EMPHASIS OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE WEST'S MOVE OF DECEMBER 1975, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE WEST HAS MADE A CONSISTENT EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TOWARDS A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. UNFORTUNATELY THE EAST HAS SO FAR FAILED TO DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH ANY OF THE MAJOR WESTERN CONCERNS. THE WEST HAD MADE THESE CONCERNS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE EAST. WHAT IS NOW NEEDED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IS A GENUINE EASTERN MOVE TO TAKE THEM ADEQUATELY INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR PROPOSALS.

B. NEUTRON - CRUISE (FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LINKAGE BETWEEN NEUTRON AND THE INITIATIVE, SEE QUESTION #1 & 1BIS, ABOVE).

15. Q. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE NEUTRON BOMB CONTROVERSY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. FIRST, THE WEST HAS NOT INTRODUCED THE ER WARHEAD IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

SECOND, NOR HAS THE EAST INTRODUCED IT AS SUBJECT MATTER FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH IT HAS MADE RHETORICAL REFERENCES TO IT.

16. Q. WHAT IS THE VALUE OF THE WESTERN OFFER TO REDUCE AND

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LIMIT US NUCLEAR WARHEADS. IF MANY OF THESE ARE OBSOLETE, CAN YOU STILL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE NEW WARHEADS, WHICH MAY BE EVEN MORE LETHAL?

A. YOUR QUESTION OVERLOOKS THE REAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER. UNDER WESTERN PROPOSALS, THERE WOULD BE A REDUCTION OF 1,000 US NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND LIMITATIONS ON THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS. IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT, US NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS IN THE AREA AND COULD EVEN INCREASE. YOU MUST ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT THIS OFFER, WHICH WAS PRESENTED BY THE WEST IN DEC 1975, ALSO INCLUDES A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE TWO MOST POWERFUL NUCLEAR US DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE AREA, NAMELY, US F-4 NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND US PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS.

17. Q. THE EAST HAS URGED THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT TRY TO USE THE NEUTRON WEAPON AS A "TRUMP CARD" IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT HAS BEEN THE WESTERN REACTION TO THAT STATEMENT?

A. I CAN'T OFFER ANY COMMENT ON THIS SINCE THE EAST HAS NEVER EXPLAINED WHAT THIS STATEMENT WAS INTENDED TO CONVEY.

18. Q. COULDN'T THE WEST USE THE NEUTRON WARHEAD AS SOME SORT OF BARGAINING CHIP IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS? FOR EXAMPLE, IT
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HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED THAT A TRADE OFF CAN BE MADE BETWEEN SOVIET TANKS AND THE NEUTRON WARHEADS. COMMENT?

A. PUBLIC DISCUSSION ABOUT "BARGAINING CHIPS" IN CONFIDENTIAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IS FREQUENTLY MISLEADING AND DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS. THEREFORE, I WILL REFRAIN FROM SPECULATION. THE WESTERN OFFER TO REDUCE ALL US NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE AREA AND TO PLACE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS REMAINS ON THE TABLE.

19. Q. ISN'T IT INEVITABLE THAT THE NEUTRON WARHEAD WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. THAT IS A SPECULATIVE QUESTION. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, MANY ISSUES AND ELEMENTS WHICH AFFECT THESE AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. AS TO THE IMPACT OF ANY SINGLE ISSUE OR ELEMENT, IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO SPECULATE ABOUT SUCH MATTERS.

20. Q. PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION TO DEFER A DECISION ON PRODUCTION OF NEUTRON POINTS OUT THAT HIS ULTIMATE DECISION QUOTE WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT IN ITS CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS PROGRAMS AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF THE

UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE UNQUOTE. IT WOULD SEEM LOGICAL TO CONCLUDE THAT HE IS REFERRING, BY IMPLICATION, TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT HE IS IMPLYING A THREAT TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY THE WARHEAD IF NO PROGRESS IS MADE HERE.

A. SEE ANSWER TO 1 BIS.

21. Q. WHAT IMPACT HAS THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE NEUTRON WARHEAD HAD IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF SECRET

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PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION?

A. IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL.

22.Q. WHAT HAS BEEN THE IMPACT OF THE CRUISE MISSILE ON THESE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. THE CRUISE MISSILE HAS NOT BEEN BROUGHT UP BY EITHER SIDE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS UNDER DISCUSSION IN THE SALT TALKS.

23. Q.ISN'T CRUISE A WEAPON YOU SHOULD HAVE SOME AGREEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ON IN VIEW OF ITS MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE IN THE AREA IN WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING REDUCTIONS?

A. THE WEST'S DEC 1975 PROPOSALS DEFINE THE ARMAMENTS THE WEST IS PREPARED TO REDUCE AND LIMIT. IN OUR VIEW, THE EAST HAS NOT PROVIDED AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THOSE PROPOSALS.

C. DATA DISCUSSION (SEE QUESTION 12, ABOVE, FOR LINKAGE BETWEEN THE INITIATIVE AND THE DATA DISCUSSION).

24. Q. COULD YOU GIVE US ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE DATA DISCUSSIONS AND WHERE THEY MIGHT COME OUT?

A. AS YOU KNOW, THE DATA WERE EXCHANGED WITHIN THE PAST MONTH AND THE ANALYSIS OF THEM IN THE WEST AND THE EAST-WEST DISCUSSION OF THEM HERE IS STILL IN PROGRESS.

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IT IS TOO EARLY TO DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS BUT, THE ADDITIONAL DATA MAY PROVIDE SOME LEADS AS TO THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. THE DISCUSSIONS HERE HAVE JUST STARTED AND WILL CONTINUE INTO THE NEXT ROUND. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME TO SPECULATE ABOUT WHERE THE DISCUSSIONS WILL COME OUT.

25. Q. WHEN WILL THE WESTERN ANALYSIS BE COMPLETED AND WHEN WILL THE DISCUSSION OF DATA HERE IN VIENNA BE BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION?

A. THE WEST DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEADLINE FOR COMPLETING EITHER THE ANALYSIS OR THE DISCUSSION OF THE DATA HERE. WE DO, OF COURSE, FEEL THAT IT SHOULD PROCEED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE SINCE AGREED DATA ARE REQUIRED FOR ANY AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.

26. A. ARE THERE ANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE OVERALL TOTALS OF THE GLOBAL DATA TABLED BY BOTH SIDES IN 1976 AND THE TOTALS OF THE DISAGGREGATED DATA EXCHANGED LAST MONTH?

A. NO. THE TOTALS OF THE GLOBAL FIGURES EXCHANGED EARLIER AND THE ADDITIONAL DATA RECENTLY EXCHANGED ARE THE SAME.

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27. Q. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE DISAGGREGATION? DOES IT INCLUDE GLOBAL FIGURES AND SEPARATE GROUND AND AIR FORCE FIGURES?

A. WE HAVE EXCHANGED ADDITIONAL DISAGGREGATED DATA ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO GO INTO THE DETAILS OF THE DISAGGREGATION FORMULA IN VIEW OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

28. Q. DOES THE WEST EXPECT THAT THE DATA DISCUSSION WILL

YIELD THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY AND THAT THE
DISPARITY IN EXCESS OF 150,000 MEN ALLEGED BY THE
WEST WILL BE EXPLAINED AWAY OR DISAPPEAR?

A. THE DATA DISCUSSIONS ARE DEVOTED TO SEEKING THE SOURCES
OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES
ON EASTERN MANPOWER. WE DO NOT EXPECT THE DISPARITY
"TO DISAPPEAR," AS YOU PHRASED IT, SINCE IT IS A
REALITY DEMONSTRATED BY WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN MANPOWER.

29. Q. WHY DOES THE WEST NOT ACCEPT THE OFFICIAL DATA TABLED
BY THE EAST, SINCE THE EAST SHOULD KNOW ITS MANPOWER
STRENGTHS BEST?

A. THERE IS A MAJOR DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND
WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF
REDUCTIONS. THE WEST HAS EXTENSIVE INFORMATION ON
THIS SUBJECT AND THE EASTERN FIGURES, AS PRESENTED
HERE, DIFFER WIDELY FROM OURS.

30. Q. EASTERN REPORTER ASKS WHY THE WEST HAS NOT RESPONDED
TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION
REGARDING AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS.

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A. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL REGARDING THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMA-
TION CONCERNING AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS IS UNDER STUDY
IN THE WEST.

31. Q. EASTERN SPOKESMAN ALLEGES THAT THE EXCHANGE OF
ADDITIONAL DATA WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE EAST'S

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-10
IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05
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S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 7 MBFR VIENNA 0222

OCTOBER 25 PROPOSALS.

A. BOTH SIDES MADE SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE CATEGORIES OF NUMBERS WHICH MIGHT BE EXCHANGED. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS WORTHWHILE TO ARGUE ABOUT WHICH SIDE DESERVES THE MOST CREDIT FOR THIS DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

D. INCREASES/MODERNIZATION

32. Q. EASTERN SPOKESMAN MAKES EXTENSIVE AND POLEMICAL CHARGES ABOUT WESTERN FORCE INCREASES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WESTERN SPOKESMAN IS ASKED TO COMMENT.

A. THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN THESE CHARGES. LET ME POINT OUT THAT WESTERN MILITARY PLANNING AND MODIFICATION OF FORCE STRUCTURES ARE THE SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE PARLIAMENTS AND IN THE MEDIA. ACCORDINGLY, THERE IS EXTENSIVE INFORMATION PUBLICLY AVAILABLE ABOUT THESE SUBJECTS AND IT IS EASY TO SELECT SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OVER EMPHASIZE AND DISTORT THEM IN VARIOUS CONTEXTS.

IN THIS NEGOTIATION, THE WEST HAS CONSISTENTLY REFRAINED FROM COMMENT ON INCREASES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN EASTERN FORCES SINCE THIS TENDS TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE DIFFICULT ISSUES
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IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS KNOWN THAT BOTH SIDES CONTINUE TO MODERNIZE THEIR FORCES, THAT IS REPLACE OLD EQUIPMENT WITH NEW EQUIPMENT. IN THE EAST, THE QUANTITIES OF MANY MAJOR WEAPONS IN THE AREA HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE AND THERE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN SOME MANPOWER INCREASES AS NEW TYPES OF UNITS HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED. IN THE WEST, THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY INCREASE IN OVERALL MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA SINCE THE START OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO GET INTO ANY NUMBERS ON THESE POINTS. BUT YOU MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THESE WESTERN ACTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RESPONSE TO THE BUILD UP OF WARSAW PACT FORCES.

IT IS EXCEEDINGLY IMPORTANT TO POINT OUT IN THIS CONNECTION THAT FOR THE WEST, DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STRATEGIES ARE COMPLIMENTARY. AND WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER, WESTERN PROPOSALS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS--INCLUDING THOSE IN THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE--PROVIDE A REALISTIC, EQUITABLE AND PRACTICAL BASIS

FOR REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. THE WEST HAS SHOWN FLEXIBILITY
WHICH SHOULD BE RECIPROCATED BY THE EAST WHICH HAS MADE NO
PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE OUTCOME IT PROPOSED AT THE OUTSET OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXTRESOR

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